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Abstract
Current state of the art in the field of UAV activation relies solely on human
operators for the design and adaptation of the drones flying routes. Furthermore,
this is being done today on an individual level (one vehicle per operators), with
some exceptions of a handful of new systems, that are comprised of a small num-
ber of self-organizing swarms, manually guided by a human operator. Drones-
based monitoring is of great importance in variety of civilian domains, such as
road safety, homeland security, and even environmental control. In its military as-
pect, efficiently detecting evading targets by a fleet of unmanned drones has an ever
increasing impact on the ability of modern armies to engage in warfare. The latter
is true both traditional symmetric conflicts among armies as well as asymmetric
ones. Be it a speeding driver, a polluting trailer or a covert convoy, the basic chal-
lenge remains the same — how can its detection probability be maximized using
as little number of drones as possible. In this work we propose a novel approach
for the optimization of large scale swarms of reconnaissance drones — capable of
producing on-demand optimal coverage strategies for any given search scenario.
Given an estimation cost of the threat’s potential damages, as well as types of mon-
itoring drones available and their comparative performance, our proposed method
generates an analytically provable strategy, stating the optimal number and types
of drones to be deployed, in order to cost-efficiently monitor a pre-defined region
for targets maneuvering using a given roads networks. We demonstrate our model
using a unique dataset of the Israeli transportation network, on which different
deployment schemes for drones deployment are evaluated.
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1 Introduction
Last decade has seen a paradigmatic change in the operational processes of modern
armies aerial forces, as designers and commanders have been gradually shifting their
focus towards unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) [31, 31, 49]. Indeed, over 50% of the
planes in the US today are unmanned, with this trend expected to further increase, and
be adopted by additional western armies in the coming years [33,76]. Israel, as a leader
of UAV technology and military adoption [35, 67], is currently relying heavily on the
use of UAVs in its military force, with such vehicles becoming an increasingly domi-
nant element of its intelligence platforms. This has been the case in visual intelligent
(VISINT), and recently also in tactical signal intelligence (SIGINT), which is tradi-
tionally in charge of 80% of the information gathered by the intelligence corps [2, 22].
Therefore, as the use of UAVs as an integral component on ongoing intelligence
gathering in wartime, as well as during the “battle within the wars” increases, so grows
the importance of the need to base this use on an efficient infrastructure. In other words,
an innovative small scale dedicated UAV squadron designed for special missions may
function perfectly with high redundancy and inefficient use of its resources, but a reg-
ular large-scale information gathering that is based on unmanned vehicles operating in
swarms, cannot. Furthermore, the lack of an efficient infrastructure that assumes con-
trol of the low-level resource utilization tasks means that these tasks must ultimately
be taken care of by the human operators (as is being done today) dramatically reduc-
ing the number of tasks these can engage, increasing the time it takes them to do so, as
well as the overall cost of this process, and ultimately significantly limiting the vehicles
operational potential.
As the complexity of the problem increases, so does the impact of optimizing ca-
pabilities on the overall resources required in order to guarantee a pre-defined level
of performance. In other words, a successful use of large scale swarms of UAVs as
a combat and intelligence gathering tool necessitates the development of an efficient
mechanism for optimization of their utilization, specifically in the design and mainte-
nance of their patrolling routes.
This work proposes an efficient and robust analytic infrastructure for the deploy-
ment of collaborative drone swarms, focusing on its application for tactic intelligence
gathering. Specifically, we present an analytic model for devising an optimal reconnais-
sance strategy for any given threat scenario, defined as : (a) The correlation function
between the cost of a single drone and its detection performance; (b) The deployment
method used (represented as a monotonically increasing function that models the cov-
erage percentage as a function of the number of units); and (c) The estimated expected
cost of an undetected threat.
In other words, for any deployment method of the drones swarm (three of which
are discussed in this paper), and an answer to the question “how much detection per-
formance do I get by using a more expensive units” the model generates an optimal
strategy that is threat-specific, namely — economically optimizing the type and quan-
tity of drones with respect to the cost of an undetected threat.
The proposed technique enables swarms of semi-autonomous vehicles to perform
an efficient ongoing dynamic patrolling and scanning of the entire roads and transporta-
tion infrastructure in a pre-defined “search region”, in a robust and near-optimal way,
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while guaranteeing detection of targets that are traveling in that region.
We demonstrate the applicability of our model using a comprehensive roads net-
work of the Israeli roads and highways system, containing over 15,000 directed links.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows : related work is presented in Section 2.
The problem and the proposed patrolling model is presented in Section 3. Analysis
is presented in Sections 4 and 5, containing among others an analytic estimation of
the required number of drones for a given threat scenario (Theorem 4.2), as well as
an analytical estimation of the optimal types of drones to be used, if several drones of
different costs and performances are available (Theorem 5.2). Section 6 presents a the-
oretical analysis of a case-study of the proposed monitoring method. Section 7 presents
a second case study, using a real world transportation network dataset in order to dis-
cuss several deployment strategies for drones swarms to be used for different types of
search regions. The data used for this analysis is presented and discussed in Section
8. Concluding remarks appear in Section 9. Readers interested in further expansion
on the mathematical analysis of this problem and similar ones are invited to read [18]
and [19], which also partially overlap with this work.
2 Related Work
The need to efficiently monitor transportation networks has been the topic of many
studies. For example, in [53], the optimal deployment of air quality monitoring units
is discussed. An efficient placement of security monitors can be found in [65]. In land
transportation, many works had focused on monitoring the transportation of hazardous
materials. For example, infectious disease outbreaks pose a critical threat to public
health and national security [26, 36]. Utilizing today’s expanded trade and travel, in-
fectious agents can be distributed easily within and across country borders as part of
a biological terror attack, resulting in potentially significant loss of life, major eco-
nomic crises, and political instability. Such threats stress even more the importance of
a reliable and efficient transportation monitoring infrastructure. A survey of homeland
security related threats and risks regarding transportation infrastructure can be found
in [32]. In [61] the trade-off between accuracy and coverage, for given limited re-
sources of sensor devices is discussed. Lam and Lo [59] proposed a heuristic approach
to select locations for traffic volume count sensors in a roadway network. [91] proposed
a sensor deployment framework to maximize such utilities. This framework has been
extended to accommodate turning traffic information [27], existing installations and O-
D information content [39], screen line problem [90], time-varying network flows [43]
and unobserved link flow estimation [52].
In its military aspects and its relevant scientific literature, it is interesting to mention
the roots of this field, dating back to World War II [64, 83]. The first planar search
problem considered is the patrol of a corridor between parallel borders separated by
a constant width. This problem aimed for determining optimal patrol strategies for
aircraft searching for ships in a channel [56], with a more generic theory of optimal
scanning that was later proposed in [66].
In recent years this problem had gained popularity with the emphasis on large scale
swarms of drones [10, 14–16, 24, 54, 57, 66, 78, 84, 85], using a variety of methods
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ranging from the analysis of the geometrical properties of the search space [8, 9], the
use of multi-agent robotics approaches [50, 79, 86] or [21, 48, 63] for biology inspired
designs (behavior based control models, flocking and dispersing models and predator-
prey approaches, respectively), economics inspired designs [46, 72, 82, 88] or physics
inspired approaches [34, 55] (see [3] for a survey of search and evasion strategies).
In general, most of the techniques used for the task of a distributed monitoring use
some sort of cellular decomposition. For example, in [74] the area to be monitored is
divided between “monitoring agents” based on their relative locations. In [30] a dif-
ferent decomposition method is being used, which is analytically shown to guarantee a
complete coverage of the area. Another interesting work is presented in [1], discussing
two methods for cooperative monitoring (one probabilistic and the other based on an
exact cellular decomposition).
While in most works the targets of the search mission were assumed to be idle, re-
cent works considered dynamic targets, meaning — targets which after being detected
by the searching robots, respond by performing various evasive maneuvers intended to
prevent their interception. Some of these works can be seen in [6, 11, 13], whereas a
variant that emphasizes the stochastic aspects of the problem can be found in [73].
3 Patrolling System Optimizing — Problem Definitions
This work analyzes the design of efficient monitoring systems through its economic
perspective. Namely, when a multitude of threat scenarios are available, the main chal-
lenge is mitigating these scenarios in the cost-effective way. That is, resolving the
real-time uncertainty regarding the exact kinds of threats through the optimization of
its overall costs (both the direct costs of the system, as well as the indirect costs of
undetected threats). It is therefore crucial to provide planners and operators with a
monitoring system that can be reconfigured in real-time, having drones deployed / ac-
tivated gradually as they are needed (due to new information regarding the unfolding
situation, and taking into account other operational requirements or budget constraints).
Our proposed model does not assume any constraint on the deployment scheme
itself, as the latter can be highly influenced by a large variety of considerations. Rather,
it enables planners to model any given deployment scheme they desire, providing the
optimal number and types of drones for each one. Our proposed model also offers
operators high flexibility regarding the types of drones to be used — modeled using
a trade off between the number of monitoring drones and their detection quality with
respect to the number of potential targets each drone can monitor simultaneously (to
be denoted as the drones’ “Sampling” quality, a number ranging between 0 and 1). In
this work we assume that a higher sampling quality implies a higher cost per drone.
Therefore, the overall cost of the monitoring system can be modeled as :
Overalll Cost = Cost per Unit× Number of Units
whereas the overall monitoring performance of the system can be modeled as :
Overalll Performance = Monitoring Coverage Percentage× Sampling
4
We note that the quality of monitoring units (i.e. their sampling rate) has in fact a
non linear effect on the overall monitoring quality. For example, assuming the sam-
pling rate of each monitor is 12 then will be able to detect slightly more than half of
the vehicles traveling in the network, because some of them might pass by more than
one monitor and thus have a chance of being detected by either one. Specifically, such
vehicles will have probability of 1 − (0.5)2 = 0.75 to be detected. Since drones’ de-
ployments is likely be done is much smaller numbers compared to the overall possible
locations, it is unlikely that many potential targets would pass by two drones during a
single trip. We can therefore use a linear approximation.
Definition 3.1. Let CATTACK(χ) denote the expected cost associated with the damage
occurred by an attack χ, used to model an undetected target.
The estimation of the damage costs are beyond the scope of this paper.
Definition 3.2. Let M(x) ∈ [0, 1] be a monotonically increasing function denoting
the percentage of potential targets moving on the roads network, that is detected and
analyzed using x monitoring units, using some given monitoring deployment scheme.
A monitoring system of n units would therefore be cost-effective as long as :
CATTACK ≥ n
M(n)
· Cost per Unit (1)
For modeling the functionM(x) we propose to use the well-known Gompertz func-
tion [47], whose general form is :
y(t) = aebe
ct
The Gompertz function is widely used for modeling a great variety of processes,
(due to the flexibly way it can be controlled using the parameters a, b and c), such as
mobile phone uptake [75], population in a confined space [40], or growth of tumors [38]
(see an illustration in Figure 1). Its ability to model the progress of optimization process
as a function of the available resources can also be seen in [4, 5, 7, 17].
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Figure 1: An illustration of the Gompertz function. The charts represent the following
functions (from left to right) : y = xe−et , y = e−xet and y = ee−xt , for x = 12 , x = 1
and x = 2.
The function M(x) can be extrapolated using simulations, as demonstrated in Fig-
ure 13. Note thatM(x) is domain dependant and may significantly change for different
networks.
In the next sections we show how this model can be used in order to calculate the
optimal number and types of the monitoring drones.
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4 The Optimal Number of Monitoring Units
Definition 4.1. The Normalized Benefit of a monitoring system of n units is defined as
the expected monetary saving from preventing attacks from which the fixed cost of the
monitoring units is subtracted :
ω , CATTACK ·M(n)− n · Cost per Unit
Note that this function can refer also to non-monetary aspects of a successful attack.
It also resembles the “Net Present Value” calculation, but without explicitly accounting
for discount rates.
Theorem 4.2. For any values of CATTACK , a, b, c and Cost per Unit, the optimal num-
ber of monitoring units that would maximize the Normalized Benefit of a monitoring
system is :
n1 =
ln
(
1
a·b·c · Cost per UnitCATTACK
)
−W
(
1
a·c · Cost per UnitCATTACK
)
c
n2 =
ln
(
1
a·b·c · Cost per UnitCATTACK
)
−W−1
(
1
a·c · Cost per UnitCATTACK
)
c
where W (x) is the Lambert product log, that can be calculated using the series :
W (x) =
∞∑
n=1
(−1)n−1nn−2
(n− 1)! x
n
Proof. The optimal value of the Normalized Benefit is received for the number of mon-
itoring units that nullifies the derivative ∂ω∂n :
∂ω
∂n
= CATTACK · ∂M(n)
∂n
− Cost per Unit
Namely :
∂M(n)
∂n
=
Cost per Unit
CATTACK (2)
(notice that we disregard interest rates, as both cost and damage can assumed to be
subject to a similar change along time).
In that case, using Equation 2 we obtain :
a · b · c · ecn · ebecn = Cost per UnitCATTACK
which in turn implies :
becn + cn− ln Cost per Unit
a · b · c · CATTACK = 0 (3)
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We note that a > 0 whereas b, c < 0. Analyzing Equation 3 we can then see that
in cases where :
Cost per Unit
CATTACK ≤ −
a · c
e
(4)
the optimal value of n would equal :
n1 =
ln
(
1
a·b·c · Cost per UnitCATTACK
)
−W
(
1
a·c · Cost per UnitCATTACK
)
c
(5)
n2 =
ln
(
1
a·b·c · Cost per UnitCATTACK
)
−W−1
(
1
a·c · Cost per UnitCATTACK
)
c
where W (x) is the Lambert product log, and where Wk(x) is its analytic continuation
over the complex plane (the values of the functions W (x) and W−1(x) in the segment
implied by the constraint of Equation 4 are illustrated in Figure 2).
Figure 2: The left and right charts depict the values of the Lambert functionsW (x) and
W−1(x) in the segment [− 1e , 0], respectively. The segment is implied by the constraint
of Equation 4.
Returning to the Normalized Benefit of the system, we can now assign the values
of the optimal number of monitoring units that appear in Equation 5 into the definition
of ω, as follows :
ω1 = CATTACK · aebecn1 − n1 · Cost per Unit
ω2 = CATTACK · aebecn2 − n2 · Cost per Unit
and using the properties of the W function, simplify it into the following form :
ωmax = max{ω1, ω2} where: (6)
ω1 = a · b · CATTACK · γ ·
(
W (b · γ) + 1
W (b · γ) − ln (γ)
)
ω2 = a · b · CATTACK · γ ·
(
W−1 (b · γ) + 1
W−1 (b · γ) − ln (γ)
)
where the Monitoring Benefit Factor γ is defined as:
γ =
1
a · b · c ·
Cost per Unit
CATTACK
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From Equation 6 we can see that the Normalized Benefit of a drones monitoring
swarm is a function of the Monitoring Benefit Factor γ, which takes into account both
the parameters of the threat (through the overall potential damages and the costs of
the monitoring units required to detect it) as well as the properties of the monitoring
method (characterized by the values of a, b and c). Notice that the value of Cost per
Unit does affect the values of a, b and c — as they are solely derived from the coverage
efficiency of the network’s traffic. However, we also note that the actual detection of
the drones swarm is affected by their sampling quality, which in turn is monotonously
affected by their cost.
5 Which Drones to Use? Optimizing the Drones’ Cost
In this section we address the issue of finding the optimal type of monitoring drones
that should be deployed. This is done by optimizing Equation 6 with respect to the cost
per single unit.
Definition 5.1. Let CostBase denote the cost of the “most expensive” drone model. That
is, the monitoring drone model with the highest level of detection available.
There is a wide range of monitoring drone models, where in most cases the cheapest
ones are expected to have the poorest performance. We define the correlation between
the sampling (or detection) quality and the cost of a single unit using a generic function,
as follows :
Sampling = fS
(
Cost Per Unit
CostBase
)
(7)
Theorem 5.2. For any values of CATTACK , a, b, c, Cost per Unit, CostBase and for
every function fS : [0, 1] → [0, 1], the optimal cost for a monitoring unit that would
maximize the Normalized Benefit of a monitoring system is a value that satisfies at least
one of the following expressions :
W (b·γ)−ln(γ)+
1− Cost Per UnitCostBase ·
∂fS
∂Cost Per Unit
[
Cost Per Unit
CostBase
]
·
(
fS
[
Cost Per Unit
CostBase
])−1
W (b · γ) = 0
W−1(b·γ)−ln(γ)+
1− Cost Per UnitCostBase ·
∂fS
∂Cost Per Unit
[
Cost Per Unit
CostBase
]
·
(
fS
[
Cost Per Unit
CostBase
])−1
W−1(b · γ) = 0
where :
γ =
1
a · b · c ·
Cost per Unit
CATTACK ·
(
fS
[
Cost Per Unit
CostBase
])−1
Proof. We first revise Equation 6 in order to take into account the different types of
monitoring units. as follows :
ωmax = max{ω1, ω2} (8)
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where ω1 and ω2 equal :
ω1 = a · b · CATTACK · Sampling · γ ·
(
W (b · γ) + 1
W (b · γ) − ln (γ)
)
ω2 = a · b · CATTACK · Sampling · γ ·
(
W−1 (b · γ) + 1
W−1 (b · γ) − ln (γ)
)
and where:
γ =
1
a · b · c ·
Cost per Unit
CATTACK · Sampling
We now proceed to the maximizing the financial merits of the monitoring system
(namely, max{ω1, ω2}). For this, we shall calculate the partial derivatives ∂ω1∂Cost Per Unit
and ∂ω2∂Cost Per Unit :
∂ω1
∂Cost Per Unit
=
1
c
·
(
W (b · γ)− ln(γ) +
1− ∂fS∂Cost Per Unit · Cost Per UnitCostBase·fS
W (b · γ)
)
(9)
∂ω2
∂Cost Per Unit
=
1
c
·
(
W−1(b · γ)− ln(γ) +
1− ∂fS∂Cost Per Unit · Cost Per UnitCostBase·fS
W−1(b · γ)
)
and the rest is implied.
Theorem 5.2 can now be used in order to calculate the optimal aspired cost of a
single drone, for every correlation between its cost and its quality of detection, and for
every deployment scheme and estimated threat’s potential.
6 Case Study I – Theoretical Analysis
In this section we demonstrate how the proposed model can be used in order to produce
the optimal number and types of monitoring drones, for a given threat scenario and
drones deployment scheme, selected by the system’s operators.
For the sake of simplicity we assume in this analysis that both sampling rates and
Cost Per Unit to be continuous. This simplifies cases where the sampling rate of the
monitoring units can be tuned resulting in lower resource utilization for lower sampling
rates (e.g. fS(Cost Per UnitCostBase ) =
(
Cost Per Unit
CostBase
)2
). In addition, we assume that the deploy-
ment scheme chosen can be modeled with a Gompertz function of a = 1, b = −0.2
and c = −0.05 (see an illustration of this function in Figure 3). In this case, nullifying
the partial derivative of Equation 9 would produce :
∂ω1
∂Cost Per Unit
= 0 −→ W (−0.2 · γ) = ln (γ) + 1
W (−0.2 · γ) (10)
∂ω2
∂Cost Per Unit
= 0 −→ W−1 (−0.2 · γ) = ln (γ) + 1
W−1(−0.2 · γ)
subsequently implying :
γopt ≈ 1.77356
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(in this example, the optimal value of γ for ω2 has a non-zero imaginary component).
Using this optimal value of γ we would now get :
γopt =
1
a · b · c ·
Cost per Unit
CATTACK · Sampling =
100 · Cost2Base
CATTACK · Cost per Unit = 1.77356
and from this we receive :
Cost per Unitopt =
100 · Cost2Base
1.77356 · CATTACK ≈ 56.384 ·
Cost2Base
CATTACK (11)
see an illustration of Equation 11 in Figure 5.
From Equation 11 we can obtain for each kind of threat the optimal type of units
that should be used, in order to maximize the Normalized Benefit of the system. In this
example we also see a linear connection between the optimal cost of the drones and the
overall estimations of the damages from a threat.
Assigning this back into Equation 5, we can get the optimal number of units, for
each potential threat (see an illustration in Figure 5) :
n1 = 20 ·W
(
−1127.68 · Cost
2
Base
C2ATTACK
)
− 172.747− 40 · ln
(
CostBase
CATTACK
)
n1 = 20 ·W
(
−1,−1127.68 · Cost
2
Base
C2ATTACK
)
− 172.747− 40 · ln
(
CostBase
CATTACK
)
(12)
Using Equations 11 and 12 we can now produce the optimal model of drones to
be deployed, and in what numbers, for any given threat1: for example, if the best
available drone model costs $5,000 per unit then for threats of potential damages that
are estimated as $600,000 (which reflect a ratio of 1120 between the cost of best unit
and the incident’s damages) we should use approximately 25 units of the type that costs
$1,100 each (and deploy them according to the selected deployment scheme described
above). However, for threats estimated at $10,000,000 in total damages (i.e. a ratio of
1
2000 ) an optimal monitoring system should be comprised of approximately 160 units,
of the type that costs $200 each.
Note that the previous example depends of course on the assumption of quadratic
relation between cost and quality of the monitoring units, as well as on the assumption
regarding the deployment scheme (i.e. the parameters of the Gompertz Model). For
any change in any for these assumptions, new corresponding solutions to the optimal
monitoring problem can be easily generated using the model.
1Our model assumes continuous selection of drones’ types. In reality of course there is a finite number
of drones model. Therefore, after producing the optimal value for the cost of a single drone, we would select
the two available models closest in cost to this optimal value (namely, the more expensive cheaper one, and
the cheapest more expensive one), assign their cost in the model, and select the one for which the merit
function is higher.
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Figure 3: An illustration of the Gompertz function e−0.2·e−0.05·t , used to simulate the
increase in monitoring coverage as a function of the increase in number of drones,
assumed in the case study of Section 6.
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Figure 4: An illustration of Equation 11, denoting the optimal cost of a single drone, as
a function of the estimations of the overall damages of a successful attack (from $10K
ro $10M). The optimal cost of a unit is shown for 4 possible values of CostBase, the
cost of the best unit available. All monetary units are given in $1K. Right chart uses a
double log scale.
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Figure 5: An illustration of Equation 12, showing the optimal number of drones as a
function of the ratio between CostBase, the cost of the best drone model available, and
the estimation regarding the overall damages of a successful attack (the ratio is denoted
by x). The left chart contains both the real and imaginary parts of the solution. The
right chart shows the segment between 0 and 0.01, where the imaginary part equals
zero.
7 Case Study II – Real World Transportation Network
Monitoring
In the previous sections we have shown an analytic method for optimizing the number
and types of monitoring units for any given deployment scheme (defined by the values
of Gomperz function’s parameters a, b and c that set the relation between the amount
of monitoring resources and the increase in monitoring efficiency).
In this section we discuss several methods for deploying a given number of moni-
toring units. The goal in all three methods is the same — maximizing the probability
that a target randomly moving in one of the network’s edges, is detected.
The most trivial method for deploying n monitoring units is of course, the ran-
dom deployment method. In other words, positioning the units in a randomly selected
nodes in the network. As we will soon see, this method achieves surprisingly well per-
formance in some cases. However, this method can be improved by taking into account
certain features of the network, resulting in improved performance in many cases.
In the coming sections we will see several such improvements, all based on traffic-
oriented improvement of the standard Betweenness Centrality method.
We then show that all methods shown in this section can be efficiently approxi-
mated using the Gompertz function y = aebect . Hence, any of those method can be
represented by a set of values of a, b and c, as required by our proposed model. In
addition, note that the last deployment method we present here achieves remarkable
results (in terms of prediction of the real traffic flow, by the analysis of the network’s
topology). Therefore, this method can be assumed as a standard deployment scheme
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for transportation networks, even regardless of the scope of this work.
The data used for the evaluation of this analysis was derived from a large number of
location-reports, collected from cell phones in Israel, and is described and discussed in
length in Section 8. Parts of the following analysis can also be found in [71] and [18].
7.1 Betweenness Centrality vs. Traffic Flow
Betweenness Centrality (BC) stands for the ability of an individual node to control
the communication flow in the networks and is defined as the total fraction of shortest
paths between each pair of vertices that pass through a given vertex [20, 44]. In recent
years Betweenness was extensively applied for the analysis of various complex net-
works [23,81] including among others social networks [77,87], computer communica-
tion networks [42, 93], and protein interaction networks [28]. Holme [51] have shown
that Betweenness is highly correlated with congestion in particle hopping systems. Ex-
tensions of the original definition of BC are applicable for directed and weighted net-
works [29, 89] as well as for multilayer networks where the underlying infrastructure
and the origin-destination overlay are explicitly defined [70].
LetG = (V,E) be a directed transportation network where V is the set of junctions
and E is the set of directed links as described in Section 8. Let σs,t be the number of
shortest paths between the origin vertex s ∈ V and the destination vertex t ∈ V (in
some applications the shortest path constraint can be relieved to allow some deviations
from the minimal distance between the two vertices). In the rest of this paper we
will refer to the shortest or “almost” shortest paths between two vertices as routes.
Let σs,t(v) be the number of routes from s to t that pass through the vertex v. The
Betweenness Centrality can hence be expressed by the following equation:
BC(v) =
∑
s,t∈V
σs,t(v)
σs,t
. (13)
Note that in this definition we include the end vertices (s and t) in the computation of
Betweenness since we assume that vehicles can be inspected also at their origin and at
the point of their destination.
After computing the Betweenness Centrality for the given transportation network,
we can easily see that the distribution of Betweenness Centrality follows a power law
(Figure 6). Long tail distributions such as the power law suggest that there is a non neg-
ligible probability for existence of vertices with very high Betweenness Centrality. This
is in contrast to the exponential flow distribution depicted in Figure 19. The different
nature of these two distributions suggests that BC as defined above will overestimate
the actual traffic flow through nodes especially for the most central vertices.
Next we would like to check the correlation between BC and traffic flow. Although
the correlation is significant the square error is very low (R2 = 0.2021) as shown in
Figure 7 (a). Every point in this Figure represents a vertex with the x-axis correspond-
ing to the measured traffic flow and y-axis corresponding to the computed BC.
We now discuss augmented variants of the Betweenness Centrality measure that
significantly improve the correlation with the traffic flow.
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Figure 6: Power law distribution of Betweenness Centrality
Figure 7: Correlation of flow through nodes and Betweeness Centrality
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7.2 Origin-Destination based Betweenness Centrality
BC definition according to Equation 13 BC assumes equal weights of routes between
every pair of vertices in the network. In other words every vertex acts as an origin
and as a destination of traffic. We would like to utilize the measured origin-destination
(OD) flow matrix in order to prioritize network regions by their actual use. For this, we
shall use the following altered definition for Betweenness, as suggested in [70]:
BC(v) =
∑
s,t∈V
σs,t(v)
σs,t
· ODs,t (14)
where OD is the actual measured origin-destination matrix. This method produces a
better correlation (R2 = 0.4916) between the theoretic (BC) and the measured traffic
flow (see Figure 7 (b)).
7.3 Improving Betweenness Centrality using Travel Properties
Shortest Routes based on Time to Travel In order to further improve our ability to
estimate the predicted network flow using the network’s topology, we note that both
BC calculation methods (Equations 13 and 14 above) assume that routes are chosen
according to shortest path strategy based on hop counting. In this section, we retain the
shortest path assumption but use weighted links for calculating the Betweenness score.
One option is to use the length of the road segments as their weights for the shortest
path calculations. Shortest path algorithms (such as Dijkstra’s or Bellman-Ford’s) are
able to consider only one distance weight on links when computing the shortest path
to a destination. We shall therefore assume that the primary heuristic guiding people
when they chose a route is the time required to reach their destination, and recompute
the BC on the directed transportation, weighting links by their free-flow travel time.
Let BCft(v) denote the Betweenness of a node v computed w.r.t. the free-flow
travel time. Figure 7 (c) shows significant improvements in the correlation between the
measured traffic flow and the theoretical BCft values computed w.r.t the OD matrix
and free-flow travel time link weights (R2 = 0.6123). We can see that there are few
nodes whose flow was significantly underestimated by the BC measure. Notice that
there are also several nodes whose flow was actually overestimated. This can be ex-
plained by the fact that people do not travel strictly via shortest paths, but may have
various deviations. In particular the deviations form shortest paths are affected by the
day time and the day of week.
Peak-Hours Aware Betweenness Centrality It is a reasonable assumption that dur-
ing peak hours travelers will choose to avoid the congested roads and choose their
routes based on the congested travel time rather than on the free-flow travel times.
Let BCct(v) denote the Betweenness of a node v computed w.r.t. the congested
time. Computing Betweenness using only the congested travel time weights results
in R2 = 0.7096. Although peak hours are relatively small fraction of the day, most
vehicles travel at these hours. This is the reason for higher correlation of BCct with
the measured traffic flow.
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We shall now combine both the Betweenness Centrality computed w.r.t. the free-
flow travel time and the congested time by taking a weighted average, namely :
BC(v) = α ·BCft(v) + (1− α) · BCct(v)
where α denotes the relative fraction of vehicles traveling during the free-flow periods.
The resulting centrality index can achieve higher correlation with the measured average
traffic flow. The maximal correlation of R2 = 0.7285 is obtained for α = 0.25 as
shown in the Figure 8.
Figure 8: Squared error (R2) as the function of the free flow traffic fraction (α).
Separating Stubs Nodes from Transit Nodes Nodes in the dataset were divided into
two groups : stub nodes and transit nodes. A Stub node (i.e., centroid) is a node that
is an origin or a destination of the traffic (as seen in the Origin-Destination matrix).
These nodes account for approximately 10% of the network’s nodes. All other nodes
(namely, nodes that generate insignificant or no outgoing or incoming routes) are called
Transit nodes, as they only forward traffic and do not generate or consume it.
Figure 7 (d) presents the correlation that is received when the two groups of nodes
are being processed separately. Specifically, the results show a R2 = 0.7068 for the
Transit nodes and a R2 = 0.7429 for the Stub nodes.
Mobility Oriented Betweenness Centrality As each type of roads has a different
functional class, we shall further improve our flow prediction by examining the Be-
tweenness values achieved when calculating it for every group separately. The results
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of the correlation that is achieved using this method are presented in Figure 9. We can
clearly see that for the more important roads (namely, those with lower type number,
representing a more infrastructural role in the transportation network) this technique
yields R2 values that are consistently above 0.74, reaching 0.83(!) for road of types
2 and 9 (note that roads of type 90 are fictive roads with infinite capacity that were
artificially added in order to connect distinct regions in the network).
It should be noted that each node may have incoming roads of different types. Each
plot corresponds to a set of nodes whose max incoming road type is as specified. In
addition, the BC calculations were not made for each set of nodes separately — BC was
computed for the complete network, while the correlations were computed separately
for each type.
Figure 9: Correlation of flow through nodes and Betweenness computed separately for
different types of links.
7.4 Optimizing the Locations of Surveillance and Monitoring Sta-
tions
In this section we use the Group variant of shortest path Betweenness Centrality (GBC)
[41] as an estimate for the utility of collaborative monitoring. In other words, we are
interested in verifying that given some mobile agent that we are interested in intercept-
ing, we position the monitoring stations in a way that maximize the chance the agent
would be captured, given the traffic patterns of the transportation network. In this case,
however, significant computational complexity issues arise, rendering the generation of
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an optimal solution impractical in real time by conventional tools that are based mostly
on behavioral based modeling. Using Group Between Centrality we propose a way to
generate efficient approximations of the optimal solution to this optimization problem.
GBC of a given group (M ⊆ V ) of vertices accounts for all routes that pass through
at least one member of the group. Let σs,t and σs,t(M) be the number of routes from
s to t and the number of routes from s to t passing through at least one vertex in M
respectively :
GBC(M) =
∑
s,t∈V
σs,t
σs,t(M)
· ODs,t (15)
GBC can be efficiently computed using the algorithm presented in [68].
Assuming the routes are weighted by the origin destination flow in transportation
networks, GBC will account for the net number of vehicles that are expected to pass
by the monitors during an hour. This net number is different from the total number of
vehicle passing by the monitors since the same vehicle can pass by several monitors
during a single trip. For example, searching for a suspected escaping terrorist car, one
would like to avoid stopping the same vehicle twice and increase the number of distinct
vehicles that were inspected. It is therefore important to maximize the GBC value of
the set of inspection stations given the number of stations deployed.
Several combinatorial optimization techniques can be used to find a group of nodes
of given size that has the largest GBC. In the following discussion we refer to a greedy
approximation algorithm for the monitors location optimization problem (Greedy) [37],
a classical Depth First Branch and Bound (DFBnB) heuristic search algorithm [58],
and recently proposed Potential Search [80].
The Greedy approximation algorithm chooses at every stage the node that has the
maximal contribution to the GBC of the already chosen group. The approximation
factor of the Greedy algorithm as reported in [37] is e− 1e .
Both the heuristic search algorithms DFBnB and the Potential Search provably find
the group having the maximal GBC. The Greedy algorithm and DFBnB were previ-
ously compared in [69] in the context of monitoring optimization in computer com-
munication networks. Given the fact that finding a group of a given size having the
maximal GBC is a hard problem, the greedy algorithm is good enough for any practi-
cal purpose (the hardness of the problem can be proven by a straightforward reduction
from the Minimal Vertex Cover problem that the problem of maximizing GBC is NP-
Complete). Figure 10 presents the results of selecting one to 39 inspection locations
using the greedy algorithm.
In certain cases (such as in various homeland security applications) deployment of
monitoring systems are often done under tight timing conditions, as a result of new
intelligence information. Therefore, any optimization method should provide close-
to-real-time capabilities. In this context, it is interesting to note that both the DFBnB
and the Potential algorithms are anytime search algorithms [94]. Their execution can
be stopped at any point of time, yielding the best solution found so far. Therefore, in
the following experiments we limit the search time to one hour, simulating a quasi-
real-time optimization constraint. Still, as can be seen in figure 11 the running time of
then Greedy algorithm is by far lower than one hour, for the entire Israeli transportation
system.
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Figure 10: The total net traffic flow that passes by monitors as a functions of the num-
ber of monitors. As expected the marginal value of additional monitors gradually de-
creases as more of them are added reaching potential traffic coverage of 30% when 39
monitoring stations are deployed.
Figure 11: The time (in seconds) that the search algorithms were executed as a function
of the number of monitors. Note that due to the high complexity nature of the search
algorithms, they present a phase transition around a tipping point (specific to each
algorithm) in the number of monitors to be optimized.
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When DFBnB and Potential Search algorithms cannot complete the search process
within the given time bounds they produce a close to optimal solution and an estimate
of its optimality (i.e. certificate). The certificate is computed by dividing the best so-
lution found so far by the upper bound on the optimal solution. The upper bound is
computed using admissible heuristic functions and is maintained by the search algo-
rithms for efficient pruning the search space. Figure 12 shows that Potential Search
produces higher certificates for its solutions within the one hour time bound for all
sizes of the monitors deployment.
Figure 12: The minimal quality of the solution (fraction of the upper bound) as a
function of the number of monitors.
7.5 Modeling Various Deployment Schemes as a Gompertz Func-
tion
Figure 13 demonstrates the performance of our monitoring method, by showing the
percentage of traffic monitored as a function of the number of monitors, for several
deployment schemes: (a) Group Betweenness, (b) Betweenness, and (c) Random de-
ployment. The benefits of the proposed method can clearly be seen from this chart.
Remarkably, using GBC based deployment strategy it is possible to cover the vast
majority of the traffic in the analyzed network (detecting any threat in probability of
approximately 0.7) using only 70 monitors. This result is most probably due to the
relatively small number of origins and destinations in the analyzed network. 680 ori-
gins/destinations account for a little bit more than 10% of the network nodes.
BC based strategy produces relatively high quality deployments for small number
of monitors (less than five). However, when 10 or more monitors need to be located ran-
dom deployment is on average as effective as choosing the most central intersections.
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Moreover, for large numbers of monitors (more than 70-80) random deployment, al-
though the simplest strategy, achieves coverage results that are very similar to choosing
the most central intersections. This result may seem surprising but in fact it is abso-
lutely reasonable. Central intersections tend to lay on the arterial roads and usually are
quite close to each other. This results in reduced marginal utility of each additional
junction joining the deployment.
Figure 13: The figure presents the results of deployment optimization performed on the
Israeli transportation network with average travel times computed using state of the art
traffic assignment model. Flows and the utility of the deployment were estimated us-
ing Betweenness Centrality and Group Betweenness Centrality models, and compared
also to the random deployment model. Whereas the BC algorithm had chosen the lo-
cations for monitoring units according to the most central intersection based on their
BC values, the GBC deployment was a greedy algorithm that tried to maximize the
net-number of vehicles passing by the monitors. The benefits of the GBC strategy is
clearly shown, as well as the ability to extrapolate this correlation between number of
monitoring units and monitored traffic percentage, in order to find the minimal number
of monitoring units required in order to guarantee certain levels of coverage.
We demonstrate Equation 3 using the results presented in Figure 13. For this, we
need to calculate the regression of the simulated measurements presented in Figure 13
to the Gompertz function. This is presented in Figure 14. The regression yields the
following results :
Random deployment : M(n) = 0.24e−2.73e
−0.03n (16)
BC deployment : M(n) = 0.51e−2.14e
−0.02n
GBC deployment : M(n) = 0.89e−2e
−0.04n
At this point, we can assign the values of a,b and c in Equation 3 and get the optimal
number of monitoring units, for any ratio between the cost of a single monitoring unit
and the expected cost of a successful attack. This is presented in 15, where the benefit
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of the GBC deployment scheme can clearly be seen, as it enables the use of much
more expensive monitoring units (which make little sense in using, when the cost of
using them is greater than the potential damage of a missed detection — due to low
monitoring efficiency).
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Figure 14: Gompertz regression of the measurements presented in Figure 13 — Ran-
dom deployment, BC deployment and GBC deployment.
8 Transportation Network Dataset
In this section we evaluate our proposed model using a real-world transportation dataset,
containing data regarding the Israeli roads structure, as well as the traffic through them
(simulating the potential targets that need to be detected or monitored). This section
presents the dataset and its various aspects, and discusses in great length its network
properties – from which the optimal deployment of the drones swarm can be derived.
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Figure 15: The optimal number of monitoring units as a function of the ratio between
the cost of a single monitoring unit, and the cost of a successful attack, for the Gompertz
regressions presented in Figure 14 for random deployment (green), BC deployment
(purple), and GBC deployment (blue). Note how both the random deployment and the
BC deployment schemes can be used only for very low-cost monitoring units, whereas
the GBC deployment scheme enables the use of much more expensive monitoring units
(due to its increased efficiency in guaranteeing high monitoring coverage).
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The widespread use of cellular phones in Israel enables the collection of accurate
transportation data. Given the small size of the country, all cellular companies pro-
vide national wide coverage. As shown in [25], the penetration of cellular phones to
the Israeli market is very high, even to lower income households, and specially among
individuals in the ages of 10 to 70 (the main focus of travel behavior studies). Such
penetration enables a comprehensive study of travel behavior that is based on the mo-
bility patterns of randomly selected mobile phones in the Israeli transportation system.
This data was shown in [25] and [92] to provide a high quality coverage of the network,
tracking 94% of the trips (defined as at least 2km in urban areas, and at least 10km in
rural areas). The resulting data contained a wealth of traffic properties for a network of
over 6,000 nodes, and 15,000 directed links. In addition, the network was accompanied
with an Origin Destination (OD) matrix, specifying start and end points of trips.
The network was created for the National Israeli Transportation Planning Model.
In urban areas the network contains arterial streets that connect the interurban roads.
For each link of the network, there is information about the length (km), hierarchical
type, free-flow travel time (min), capacity (vehicles per hour), toll (min), hourly flow
(vehicles per hour), and congested travel time (min). The hourly flows and congested
travel times were obtained from a traffic assignment model that loads the OD matrix
on the network links.
8.1 Network Structure
Based on the dataset described above we have created a network structure, assigning
running indices from 1 to 6716 to the nodes (junctions). We have examined the directed
variant of the network where each road segment between two junctions was represented
as either one or two directed links between the respective nodes.
In order to get a basic understanding of the network we first extracted and stud-
ied several of its structural properties (see Table 1). We have partitioned the network
into structural equivalence classes of the nodes and bi-connected components and com-
puted the Betweenness Centrality indices of the nodes (Betweenness Centrality is an
important network feature that measures the portion of shortests paths between all the
pairs of nodes in the network, that pass through a particular node. See more details
in [44, 60, 62]). Structurally equivalent vertices have exactly the same neighbors and
the set of these vertices is called a structural equivalence class. As can be seen from
Table 1 the number of structural equivalence classes is roughly the number of vertices
in the network and the size of the largest class is three. This means that there are no
“star-like” structures in the network and alternative paths between any two vertices
are either longer than two hops or have other links emanating from the intermediate
vertices. On the other hand the number of biconnected components in the network is
low compared to the number of nodes, meaning that there are significant regions of the
network that can be cut out by merely disconnecting a single node.
8.2 Congestions
In this paper we define the impact of congestion as the difference between the time
to travel through a congested link and the free-flow time to travel. Congestion of a
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Figure 16: A map of the Israeli transportation network that was used for this paper.
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Table 1: Structural properties (Israeli transportation network).
Nodes 6716
Edges (undirected representation) 8374
Edges (directed representation) 15823
Number of structural equivalence classes 6655
Largest equivalence class 3
Number of bi-connected components (BCC) 931
Avg BCC size 8.2
Largest BCC 5778
junction can be either inbound or outbound. Inbound congestion is the sum of all
congestions on inbound links of some junction. Figure 17 presents the distribution of
congestion on network nodes (junctions). Power law nature of this distribution means
that vast majority of nodes are not congested but there are a few nodes whose conges-
tion can be arbitrarily large. Based on the Wardrop‘s User Equilibrium [45] this also
implies a low number of yet significant deviations between the routes chosen by trav-
elers during free-flow and during congestions. In Section 7.3 we use this fact to merge
between two routing strategies.
Figure 17: Power law distribution of congestion.
8.3 Flow
The analyzed dataset contains traffic flow through links provided as the number of
vehicles per hour. We compute the total inbound flow through a node by summing
flows on all of its inbound links, where outbound flow is computed symmetrically.
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Unless a specific junction is a source or a destination of traffic we expect the inbound
flow to be equal to the outbound flow. Figure 18 demonstrates the correlation between
inbound and outbound flow. We see that vast majority of the nodes are located on the
main diagonal, however, there are some deviations, caused by the fact that the data
represents average measurements that were carried out along a substantial period of
time.
Figure 18: Incoming vs. outgoing flow for each node.
Figure 19 presents the distribution of inbound flow on network nodes. This distri-
bution is exponential, meaning that a vast majority of nodes have little flow through
them. However, in contrast to network congestion, there are no “unbounded fluctua-
tions”, i.e. the flow through the most “busy” junctions is not as high as can be expected
from the power law distribution of betweenness and congestions (Figures 17 and 6).
In fact, congestions significantly limit the flow through the busiest junctions, which
subsequently is the reason we do not see the long tail in flow distribution.
9 Conclusions
In this paper we have discussed the problem of optimizing the type, number and loca-
tions of surveillance drones trying to detect maneuvering targets that move on top of
a pre-defined transportation network. We have presented a model for analytically gen-
erating an optimal monitoring strategy, flexible enough to support various models of
drones (of different costs and performance specifications), as well as any deployment
scheme used. For each threat, the model produces an optimal strategy, based on the
estimation of the threat’s overall potential damages.
We have validated our model using a variety of deployment schemes, among which
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Figure 19: Exponential distribution of traffic flow through nodes.
was an extremely efficient scheme we have developed, which is a transportation ori-
ented variant of the Network Betweenness measure. We have then evaluated the model,
as well as this deployment scheme, using a comprehensive dataset that covers the Israeli
transportation network, and demonstrated how the optimal locations of any (reason-
able) amount of drones can be approximated in high accuracy. The method proposed
in this paper can now be used in order to generate highly efficient dynamic monitoring
strategies, for a multitude of real-time threats, of different operational parameters.
A more theoretical approach to this problem that studies the complexity of all pos-
sible strategies for a collaborative monitoring of a given area at which an unknown
number of targets dynamically maneuver can be found in [16]. An additional similar
variant to this problem is the search for pollutant emitting vehicles, where the merit
function is derived from environments considerations [71]. It is interesting to men-
tioned that in those variants as well, the topological properties of the network along
which the “targets” can move significantly influence the ability of drones to track them,
as was pointed out in [8, 9].
In future works we plan to conduct a thorough study of the way this method can
be used for resource allocation scenarios involving several types threats, using het-
erogenous deployment strategies that would utilize drones of different characteristics
simultaneously. In addition, we intend to conduct a further analysis of the resilience of
the method, under uncertainty (regarding the topology, potential threats, and noises in
the deployment scheme).
Finally, it is interesting to note that the problem of finding optimal (and optionally
dynamic) monitoring strategy is related to other kinds of monitoring problems, such
as “reverse-monitoring” – maximizing the exposure of a certain signal, or campaign
to a population [19], or monitoring for evading land targets by a flock of Unmanned
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Air Vehicles (UAV). In this problem, however, the fact that the paths of the UAVs is
unconstrained (as they are flying in the air) makes the calculation of a near-optimal
monitoring strategy fairly easy [12, 13].
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